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Abstract— The paper focuses on the hazardous situations that 
can rise in urban areas in case of earth fault inside a High 
Voltage/Medium Voltage station. IEEE and IEC/EN Standards 
and technical documents are examined and discussed, in order to 
propose some practical guidelines for a safe integration of such 
installations in contexts characterized by the presence of low 
voltage systems and not trained persons.  
Keywords— Substations; Safety; Earth fault; Global Earthing 
Systems 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
High Voltage/Medium Voltage (HV/MV) stations are 
integrated in the urban context and, therefore, built very close 
to residential, commercial and tertiary buildings supplied by 
the low voltage (LV) utility grid (Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1. Example of HV/MV station integrated in an urban area with 
residential building in the neighborhood. 
In the event of a single-line-to-earth (1LtE) fault occurring 
on the HV side inside such a station, high voltages can be 
transferred to the closest buildings, creating dangerous 
situations for persons or damage to equipment insulation. 
by the Research on the Electric System Programme. Consequently, a 
proper design of the earthing system of a HV/MV station in an 
urban areas must take into account not only the protection 
against electric shock of the station personnel but also the 
protection of persons outside its boundaries. 
In particular, it is mandatory to protect against dangerous 
touch and step voltages the public immediately outside the 
station fences or outer walls, that are mainly exposed in the 
case of 1LtE. 
Also the presence of water or gas pipelines, external 
continuous metal fences or railways must be considered in the 
design of the earth electrode of the station [1]. In fact, the 
above-mentioned metal elements can be responsible of the 
transfer of the earth potential rise (or part of it) to great 
distances from the fault, in places where an adequate protection 
against dangerous touch and step voltage can not be easily put 
into effect [2]. 
Starting from these considerations, the present paper 
analyses various elements that influence the transfer of the 
hazard from the station towards neighboring installations, when 
a 1LtE fault occurs within a HV/MV station. Moreover, based 
on IEEE and IEC/EN standards, the paper proposes an 
operative protocol for assessing the risk and some measures to 
be applied for reducing the hazard due to the fault. Finally, an 
application example of the risk assessment methodology is 
proposed. 
The novelty of the paper is in the merging of both IEEE and 
IEC/EN main recommendations in order to propose an unique 
and practical guide for protecting against the risks due to the 
proximity of HV/MV substations to LV installations. 
II. HAZARDOUS SITUATIONS 
The presence of a HV/MV station inside an urban areas 
gives place to hazardous situations for persons due to the 
following issues: 
• voltages transferred from the faulted HV/MV station to 
MV/LV cabins, trough the metal shields of the cables of 
the MV lines supplied by the station; 
• accessible metal fences; 
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• metal pipelines connecting the earthing system of the 
faulted substations to the earth electrodes of the 
surrounding buildings; 
• metal railways outgoing from the station; 
• stress voltages rising in presence of LV network neutral 
point earthed at the same earthing system of the faulted 
station. 
A. Transferred voltages 
This issue has been deeply discussed in some previous 
papers of the same authors [3]-[4]. The studies carried out 
show that in case of a 1LtE fault occurring at the HV/MV 
substation, the substations closest to the supply experiment 
very high values of the earth potential rise. These values are 
less influenced by the number of secondary substations of the 
MV line, the number of MV lines, the distance between the 
substations and the values of the substation’s earth resistance. 
The increase of the number of line outgoing the HV/MV 
station gives place to a reduction of the earth potential rise at 
the substations. On the other side, the connection of the earth 
electrodes of the secondary substations to the earthing system 
of the HV/MV substation does not give significant advantages 
to the HV/MV substations itself. 
B. Metal fences 
A correct earthing of metal fences around HV/MV 
substations is of vital importance because they are accessible to 
the public. The safety concerns related to these elements are 
deeply discussed in the IEEE Standard 80/2013 [5], in the 
National Electric Code [6] and in the IEC Standard 61936-1 
[7]. Metal fences’ earthing can be accomplished in two 
different ways: electrically connecting the fence to the 
substation earthing grid (in this case the metal fence can be 
inside or outside the grid area), using a separated earthing 
systems (in this case the metal fence MUST be outside the grid 
area). IEC Standard 61936-1 suggests, as a measure for 
reducing touch voltage outdoor the substation, to install a 
supplementary horizontal earth electrode connected to the 
fence at about 1 m from the fence and at a maximum depth of 
0.5 m, as depicted in Fig. 2 (recognized specified measure 
M2.2).  
A situation that must be addressed in presence of metal 
fences is the case in which metal fences do not follow the 
normal equipotential lines on the earth surface resulting from a 
fault in the HV/MV station. In such a case, a voltage 
distribution as that reported in Fig. 3 can occur, due to the 
electrical continuity of the fence. For avoiding the rise of 
dangerous voltages in correspondence of the fence poles, it is 
necessary to introduce insolating joints in the fence.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Potential grading for substations’ metal fences [17]. 
C. Metal pipelines 
When metal pipes electrically connect the HV/MV station 
to surrounding buildings, the latter should be treated as part of 
the station with regards to the protection against dangerous 
voltages. This is not always possible in an urban area where the 
buildings are supplied by the LV utility grid and are equipped 
with simple rods as earth electrodes. LV installations’ earth 
electrodes are, indeed, able to contain the Earth Potential Rise 
(EPR) due to a fault at the LV side below the tolerable limits 
imposed [6], [8], [9], whereas the protection against electric 
shock assured by the earth electrode of a HV/MV station is, 
generally, done containing touch and step voltages. For this 
reason, the connection between LV and HV installations’ 
earthing systems can be accepted without further investigation 
only if the earthing system of the station is declared 
intrinsically safe, as defined in [10].  
Consequently, insulating joints should be installed on the 
metal pipes outgoing the station, as represented in Fig. 4. 
Electrical separations of parts of pipelines on the two sides 
of the substations border is suggested both by IEEE Standards  
[5], [11], [12], and by IEC/EN standards [7], [13], [14], [15], 
[16], [17]. 
D. Metal railways 
Railways entering a substation must be connected to it 
earthing systems. The connection can create a hazard situation 
at an external location by transferring all or a portion of the 
earth potential rise due to a 1LtE fault.   
IEEE Standard 80/2013 suggest removing the track sections 
from the substation or, as indicated also by EN Standard 
50522, using insulating joints (Fig. 5). Instead of insulating 
joints, an alternative solution is that of substituting a metal 
track section with an insulating one. This solution reduces the 
probability of short circuit of the tracks towards remote earth. 
 
 
 Fig. 3. Voltage profile on the soil surface due to a 1LtE fault in the 
substation, in presence of a long continuous metal fence [17]. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Metal water pipeline crossing the substation border [17]. 
 
Fig. 5. Insulating flanges for railways [17]. 
E. Stress voltages 
In the case the neutral point of MV/LV transformers is 
connected to the grounding system of a close HV/MV station, 
the hazard due to stress voltages on the insulation of the 
components connected to the LV network must be checked. 
According to EN Standard 50522. Being 1LtE faults eliminated 
in less then 5 seconds, LV neutral point can be connected to the 
station earth electrodes is the maximum earth potential rise due 
to the fault does not exceed 1200 V. 
III. GUIDELINES FOR RISK ASSESSMENT 
Table I reports a checklist for assessing the risk due to a 
1LtE fault occurring in a HV/MV station located in an urban 
areas. The list is based on the above-reported considerations 
and on the application of the recognized specified measures M 
defined by IEC Standard 61936-1 and EN Standard 50522.  
The table reports: 
• measures I, assuring safety with reference to all 
the aspects reported in Section II (pipelines, 
fences, etc.); 
• measures M, assuring protection against the 
transfer of dangerous voltage to the MV/LV 
substations through the metal shields of the MV 
cables; 
• measures F, assuring protection of persons in 
contact with the outer walls or fences of the 
HV/MV station; 
• measures P, assuring protection against the 
transfer of dangerous voltages through metal 
pipes; 
• measure R, assuring protection against the transfer 
of dangerous voltages through railways; 
• measure S, assuring protection of the insulation of 
the LV installations. 
• The risk assessment is done as described below. 
• It is evaluated if the earthing system is 
intrinsically safe. If so, no other measures are 
necessary. If not, it must be investigated if metal 
fences, cable metal shields, pipelines and railways 
are present and, if so, measures C, F, P, R and S 
must be taken. In the following an application 
example is reported. 
IV. APPLICATION EXAMPLE 
Let’s consider a HV/MV station in an urban areas, with the 
following characteristics: 
• five MV cable lines with ARG7H1RX cables, 
outgoing from the station; 
• perimeter reinforced concrete walls on three sides and 
a metal fence on one side; 
• earthing grid of the station within the boundaries of 
the station (outer wall and fence);  
• no railways ingoing in the station;  
• one metal pipe from the local aqueduct entering the 
station boundaries. 
The EPR at the station due to a 1LtE fault on the HV side is 
6000V. Therefore, the earthing system is not intrinsically safe 
and, in addition, measure S.1 must be carried out for 
preventing damage of LV insulation due to stress voltages 
(EPR is above 1200V). 
The MV cables have copper screens that must be 
disconnected from the earthing system of the station (measure 
C.1), connected together and isolated for becoming not 
accessible to the personnel (measure C.2). 
For protecting the public close to the perimeter walls and 
fence, the floor outside the station must be done with high 
resistivity material (measure F.7). Potential grading is carried 
out by installing a horizontal earth electrode connected to the 
earthing grid of the station at a distance of 1 m outside the 
fences and buried at a depth not over 0.5 m (measure F.5). 
Moreover, the fences must be interrupted by insulating joints 
(measure F.6). Finally, the metal pipe arriving at the station 
must be connected to not metal pipes for the water distribution 
within the station and must be isolated from the soil (measure 
P.2). 
TABLE I 
CHECKLIST FOR ASSESSING THE RISK IN CASE OF 1LTE FAULT IN A HV/MV 
STATION 
I.1 The earthing system of the station is intrinsically safe and is able to 
contain the EPR within the value of 50V. 
C.1 Disconnection of the metal shields of the MV cables from the earthing 
system of the HV/MV station. The connection point must be made not 
accessible to the workers inside the station. 
C.2 Connection of all the metal shields of all the MV lines outgoing the 
station. The connection point must be made not accessible to the 
workers inside the station. 
F.1 Use of non conductive fences. 
F.2 Use of non-conductive outer walls. 
F.3 No grounded metal parts accessible from outside the HV/MV station. 
F.4 Earthing of the metal fence by the station earthing system or by a 
separated earthing system if the fence is outside the station’s earth 
electrode area. 
F.5 In case of conductive perimeter fences, potential grading by installing 
a horizontal ground electrode connected to the grounding grid at a 
distance of 1 m outside the fences and buried at a depth not over 0.5 
m. 
F.6 Installation of insulating joints in the metal fences. 
F.7 Use of high resistivity material for covering the soil outside the station 
P.1 Use of insulating flanges on metal pipes outgoing the station. 
P.2 Use of insulating pipes inside the station. 
R.1 Remove unused track sections. 
R.2 Installation of insulating joints between tracks. 
R.3 Substitution of a metal track section with an insulating one. 
S.1 If the maximum earth potential rise in the HV/MV station is over 
1200 V, disconnect the neutral point of the MV/LV transformers from 
the earth electrode of the station. 
V. CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the hazard due to a 1ltE fault inside a 
HV/MV station located in an urban area has been presented. 
The main international standards have been examined in order 
to define a procedure for assessing the risk for the LV 
installations due to the fault. Finally, an application example of 
the risk assessment methodology has been provided. 
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